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Financial conglomerates have evolved in many countries with a developed financial system, 
their presence and impact are however quite diverse in these economies. Since this 
phenomenon raises interesting questions about the stability and efficiency of the financial 
system as well, it is worth examining first of all what kind of effects the participation in a 
group formed by different financial firms has on the participating institutions. Motivated by 
this reason in this paper I examine some hypotheses concerning the impact of financial 
conglomerates in the Hungarian pension fund market. Based on the common view present in 
the related literature more effective operation and better performance of the participating 
funds may be assumed. In contrast to this, the results are mixed: an overall evidence in 
support of the greater effectiveness and better performance of the participating funds could 
not be found, although there are some features that show an impressive advantage of the 
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Progressing integration between different parts of the financial sector have promoted 
the evolution of financial conglomerates especially in the last years. Dependig on 
previous experience the convergence of financial activities such as for example 
banking and insurance have occured in several ways in almost every developed 
country, and in many cases cooperation between representants of different parts of the 
financial sector takes also an institutional form. Changing conditions in the technical 
background and the requirements of the demand side of the financial markets have 
strongly affected the operation of traditional financial intermediaries and new 
institutions as well. The new phenomenon of evolving financial conglomerates raises 
many questions regarding among others the effectiveness of these conglomerates from 
which only few have already been completely answered.  
 
One of the most interesting questions is, what are the incentives for building these 
formations. In the recent literature some attempts have already been made to define 
and measure the factors that may lead to the formation of financial conglomerates. 
Some researchers have studied the efficiency and performance of institutions in and 
outside these conglomerates and found that the evidence is quite complex: in some 
cases the participating institutions operate more efficiently than the non-participating 
ones, but there are also contradicting examples. Efficiency gains may, in turn, not 
completely explain the presence of financial conglomerates. Despite the fact that 
conglomeration is one of the latest development of financial systems, a growing 
number of studies deal with the theoretical and empirical aspects of this problem; 
although there is still no convincing evidence that would support the hypothesis that 
the evolution of financial conglomerates is based strictly on economic considerations 
and performance or efficiency expectations. The macro- and microaspects of the 
tendence towards conglomeration in financial systems are related in the theoretical 
literature to the problems of the financial intermediation and the efficiency of 
financial institutions. Both of these approaches suggest, that in general there can be 
circumstances, where conglomeration may be a reasonable response to the challenges 
financial institutions face nowadays. This however provides no unambiguous answer 
to the question, what are the factors that lead to the formation of conglomerates 
between financial institutions and whether it is economically advantageous for the 
participating institutions. Empirical researches have already also studied this question 
by estimating for example „scope economies” for financial institutions that „produce” 
different financial services, but a generally valid answer to the original question could 
also not been found.  
 
After all, the original question about the incentives for the formation of financial 
conglomerates can be formulated from an other aspect: do financial institutions which 
belong to a conglomerate significantly differ from other institutions in the same 
sector? It remains an interesting problem, what are the most significant factors that 
explain the differences between the participating institutions in a financial 
conglomerate and the other firms within a special financial sector. If obvious 
differentiating factors could be found, one could come closer to the essence of this 
interesting conglomeration-phenomenon. So as to avoid methodological difficulties 
this type of analysis requires data about a financial sector, which has enough 
institutions that belong or do not belong to conglomerates. In this paper I examine the 
Hungarian voluntary pension fund market that not only corresponds these needs but 
has the additional advantage of „producing” the same financial service in every  
2 
institution. The relation of the participation in a financial conglomerate and the 
differences in the efficiency and other characteristics of the examined institutions may 
better be analysed so. In this way I attempt to clear up which are the fields in the 
operation of an institution in which financial conglomerates cause significant effects. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background material on the 
hypotheses and on the state of financial conglomeration. Section 3 discusses the 




2. Financial conglomeration 
Although the exact definition of financial conglomerates is relatively diverse in 
different papers, there is a consensus that a financial conglomerate realises a kind of 
cooperation between financial institutions that belong to different sectors. As one of 
the most influential participant in the regulation of financial activities in developed 




„… financial groups that provide services and products in different sectors of 
the financial markets, called financial conglomerates.” 
 
In the related literature, the definition of financial conglomerates is essentially very 




„Financial conglomerates are financial institutions that may offer the entire 
range of financial services. Next to performing the traditional banking 
operations, they may sell insurance, underwrite securities and carry out 
security transactions on behalf of their clients.” 
 
The formation of financial conglomerates means a kind of combination of different 
financial services such as for example banking and insurance. This phenomenon in the 
financial services sector is in connection with the transformation of the financial 
intermediation in several developed economies, which has already made feel its 
impact also in the intermediation theory. According to the registered data in almost 
every developed financial system, the importance of the traditional intermediary 
institution (banks, or depository institutions) generally decline or stagnate but new 
forms of financial institutions such as for example pension funds experience rapid 
rise. One of the conclusions from this situation can be, that financial intermediaries 
may be of increasing importance to the economy, but the development of the non-
traditional intermediary institutions suggests that other than the traditional functions 
may be under way to strengthen. As for example SCHOLTENS-VAN WENSVEEN[2000] 
responds to the statements of the intermediation theory of ALLEN-SANTOMERO[1997], 
one of the greatest challenges of future research might be the analysis of the risk-
                                                           
1 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary 
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial 
conglomerate …  
2 VANDER VENNET[1998]  
3 
reward relation on the macroeconomic level
3, and particularly the remuneration of the 
financial intermediation industry for its risk transforming activity. The formation of 
financial conglomerates is connected with the changes in the financial services 
industry and can provide an answer to the changing needs for risk management. As 
CECCHETTI[1999] also points out, one of the functions financial intermediation will 
increasingly have to perform is to „package and sell risk, or to repackage or resell 
risk”, in which process risk can not only intermediated by traditional banking 
activities but also by means of for example sales to insurance companies.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that financial conglomerates play an increasingly 
important role in the financial sector. The cooperation between the participating 
institutions can have many institutional forms, a special case is when it comes to a 
merger or an acquisition. Analysing the M&A
4 activities in the banking sector of the 
European Union, the European Central Bank concluded in a study
5, that „economies 
of scope are the predominant motive for domestic conglomeration”, while for 
international conglomeration „the two major reasons are economies of scope and 
size.” The magnitude of these mergers and acquisitions is however not very extensive 
but significant. As LOWN –OSLER-STRAHAN-SUFI[2000] present: from 1985 to 1999 in 
the values of targets in financial institutions M&A activity insurance companies that 
acquired insurance companies represented in Europe 6,4 % (in the United States 8,4 
%), while commercial bank that acquired banks represented in Europe 5,2 % (and in 
the United States 0,1 %). The original question appears here again: why can 
significant cooperation be observed between different financial institutions such as 
banks and insurance companies which may lead to the formation of financial 
conglomerates? The analysis of some large formations which include banks and 
insurance companies shows, that in certain cases the development of financial 
conglomerates brought favourable effects for the participating institution. 
CAROW[2001] for example concludes that in the United States – where the closer 
cooperation of the banking and insurance sector is traditionally hindered by several 
barriers – investors expect large banks and insurance companies to receive significant 
benefits from the removal of barriers between the deeper cooperation. The reason for 
this development may be that financial conglomerates operate for example more 
efficiently and perform in some cases better than more specialized institutions. 
Analysing the efficiency and performance of a set of financial conglomerates in 
Europe,  VANDER  VENNET[1998] concluded that in certain aspects financial 
conglomerates are more efficient than their more specialized competitors. Together 
with the result of other studies there seems to be a consensus, that there may be 
circumstances in which financial conglomerates perform better and operate more 
efficiently than specialized institutions in the same sectors. In the next section I 
examine whether in the Hungarian voluntary pension fund market pension funds 
which can be treated as participants in financial conglomerates differ in selected 
essential characteristics (such as for example efficiency) from other institutions which 




                                                           
3 Risk analysis – in the modern portfolio theory – has already been fully incorporated on the micro 
level in pricing models. 
4 Merger and Acquisition 
5 Mergers and acquisitions involving the EU banking industry [2000]  
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3. Data and methodology 
In Hungary, the number of firms in the financial sector – related to the size of the 
demand – is relatively low compared to countries with greater financial markets, and a 
tendence towards financial conglomeration can be found especially among the firms 
with the greatest market power. So as to examine the factors that significantly 
separate participating and non-participating firms in a special field, I have chosen the 
market of the Hungarian voluntary pension funds where a more considerable set of 
data is available for research purposes.  
 
In the Hungarian three-pillar pension system pension funds play an important role in 
collecting savings to secure the later retirement income of the working population. 
Pension funds can be founded since 1994, but since the pension reform in 1998 
pension funds are also an integrated part of the mandatory pension system and beside 
the pay-as-you-go first pillar they form its second pillar too. The pension funds, in 
which the participation remained voluntary, form the third pillar of the pension system 
by allowing a favourable (also supported by tax allowances) opportunity to collect 
savings for a supplementary retirement income. In this paper I only examine voluntary 
pension funds, because though the operation and the related regulations of the 
mandatory and voluntary pension funds are quite similar, the differences and 
similarities of these two groups are worth analysing separated. Some of the voluntary 
pension funds were funded and are operated by a bank or an insurance company and 
can be treated as parts of financial conglomerates. 
 
 
For the analysis I collected data from publicated financial statements of the pension 
funds for 1999 and 2000. From the balance sheets and income statements and other 
publicated data of the voluntary pension funds I calculated different variables, that 
contain information about the efficiency and performance of the funds. The selected 
17 variables were constructed in a way, that possibly every important aspect of the 
operation of the funds are represented and the dependence between variables is 
minimized. The variables were calculated for every registered voluntary pension fund 
in Hungary, but because of inconveniences in the interpretation of the values at some 
observations, a part of the data was excluded from the analysis (the number of funds 
in the analysis was reduced to 89).  
 
To analyse the structure of the voluntary pension fund market I used multidimensional 
statistical methods: factor and cluster analyses were applied to recognise relatively 
homogeneous groups in the data and discriminant analyses and ANOVA-analyses 
were employed to identify the effects of the participation in a financial conglomerate 
on the efficiency and performance of the funds. In the interpretation of the following 
results is however important that in most cases there are requirements that the data 
does not meet: the assumptions of normal distribution of the variables and the identity 
of the covariance matrices in different groups in the discriminant analyses are violated 
and in consequence the numerical results have to be treated in most cases only as 
indicators of different tendencies. But as indicators, the validity of the conclusions is 
not violated where the analysis results in an extremely significant outcome, in this 
case we have a meaningful result, that will also be emphasised in the related parts of 





4. Hypotheses and empirical results 
Based on the collected data and selected variables I examine some hypotheses about 
the effect of the participation in a financial conglomerate on the efficiency and 
performance of different voluntary pension funds in Hungary.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1.:  
PENSION FUNDS,  THAT PARTICIPATE IN FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES REPRESENT 
SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER MARKET POWER
6. 
 
To test this hypothesis I used first a discriminant analysis with all the 17 variables, 
that resulted (since we examine the separation of two groups: participating and non-
participating funds) in one discriminant function.
7 The conclusions about the 
separation of the groups can be drawn from the strength of the correlation between the 
discriminant function and the selected variables. The analysis showed, that the four 
variables, whose correlations with the discriminant function was greater than 0.5, 
measured in some form the market power of the funds (for example membership and 
accumulated savings). The following values are taken by the discriminant function at 
the group centroids (P.CSOP. = 1 means the group that is formed by the funds which 
participate in financial conglomerates): 
 
 
P.CSOP. = 0  -0.59
P.CSOP. = 1  3.82
 
 
The values show a significant separation, and because the analysis is based on 
standardized data, the results also indicate that the funds which participate in financial 
conglomerates are clearly over the average size (in the case of standardized variables 
this means 3.82 is above zero). The same results appear in the histograms of the 
discriminant function in the two groups, on the following graphs a visible separation 
of the groups can also be observed: 
 
 
                                                           
6 Market power refers here to characteristics and variables such as for example membership and 
accumulated savings in the pension funds.  
7 The theoretical background for the discriminant analysis is, that taken the (standardized) database X 
we attempt to maximize λ=c
TKc / c








From the solution (B
-1K - λE)c=0  we obtain  λ and c from which we can calculate discriminant 
functions that optimally separate the given groups. The number of the discriminant factors depends on 
the number of the variables and the number of the groups, but in this analysis it cannot be greater than 
1 (because B
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An other method to test the hypothesis is to apply a factor analysis to the 17 selected 
variables and make a one-way ANOVA analysis with the factor that represents 
„market power”
8 and the two groups. After running 7 different factor analyses it came 
out that there exists a factor that shows high correlations with the variables that 
measure market power and practically no correlations with other variables. In the one-
way ANOVA analysis differences from the group means and the general mean are 
measured and with sum of squares can be observed, to what extent the total sum of 
squares is explained by the different group means. In this case, for the „market 
power” factor and the two groups the following results are obtained: 
 
 
  Sum of squares df  F  sig.  
Between groups  47.20 1  100.68  0.00 
Within groups  40.79 87     
 
 
Though the results – in consequence of the mentioned lacking requirements – cannot 
be numerically interpreted, the tendence is clear: it is visibly that the funds which 
belong to financial conglomerates represent significantly greater market power. 
 
                                                           
8 In the sense defined above: market power refers to characteristics such as for example membership 
and accumulated savings in the pension funds.   
7 
After all, Hypothesis 1. can be accepted: that means, that pension funds which 
belong to a financial conglomerate represent among pension funds relatively greater 
market power: they have a greater membership or for example a greater amount of 
capital accumulated from the members. The ANOVA-analysis only suggests that 
there is a significant difference between pension funds that participate in financial 
conglomerates and other pension funds that do not have a financial conglomerate 
background. A further analysis is required to show the direction of the difference: the 
values of the discriminant function at the two group centroids (participating and not 
participating funds) suggest that the measure of „market power”
9 takes at pension 
funds which belong to financial conglomerates values that are significantly above the 




HYPOTHESIS 2.:  
PENSION FUNDS,  THAT PARTICIPATE IN FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES ARE MORE 
(OPERATION) COST-EFFICIENT. 
 
In this analysis I examined operation cost efficiency, that is related to cost items such 
as for example wages and amortization. In the literature „cost efficiency” is often 
referred to, now I would like to show that there are different groups of costs and 
efficiency can not automatically expected at every category.  
 
Among the selected 17 variables 2 are related to cost efficiency (operation costs/all 
assets and operation costs/a variable that measures the changes in revenues). These 
two variables correlate at a relatively low level with the discriminant factor (the 
correlation ratios are –0.045 and –0.068, respectively), which means that in the 
separation of the two groups (participating and non-participating funds) they play an 
insignificant role.  
 
In the factor analyses a factor that shows high correlation with these two variables and 
no significant correlation with other variables could also be found. This „operation 
cost efficiency” factor produced in the one-way ANOVA analysis similar results; it 
showed that in the two groups (participating and non-participating funds) there is no 
significant difference in the operation cost efficiency: 
 
 
  sum of squares df  F  sig.  
Between groups  0.30 1  0.29  0.58 
Within groups  87.69 87     
 
 
The results show that the means of the two groups can be treated relatively 
significantly identical. 
 
Based on these results Hypothesis 2. is rejected: which means that the cost 
efficiency of pension funds which belong to financial conglomerates can statistically 
                                                           
9 The values of the created „factor”, which has strong relationship with factors that measure for 
example membership and accumulated savings.   
8 
not be treated as different from that of other funds. The analysis showed, that 
statistically there is no significant difference in the operation cost efficiency of the 






HYPOTHESIS 3.:  
THE INVESTMENT PRACTICE OF PENSION FUNDS,  THAT PARTICIPATE IN FINANCIAL 
CONGLOMERATES IS MORE CONSERVATIVE. 
 
In this analysis investment practice is treated as conservative, when in the investments 
the focus is rather on less riskier bonds than on more riskier stocks. In the 17 variables 
there are three that measure the conservativeness of the investment policy and in the 
testing of the hypothesis I use these individual variables, since in the factor analyses 
no factor could be constructed that would have contained a large enough part of the 
information in these variables.  
 
In the discriminant analysis the correlations of the three variables with the 
discriminant factor are not significant (their absolute value is under 0.1), which means 
that they do not play an important role in the separation of the two examined groups. 
In the one-way ANOVA analyes the same results appear: none of these variables 
takes significanly different values at the participating and non-participating funds, 
which also means that the investment practice of funds that participate in financial 
conglomerates is not significantly differ from that of other funds. 
 
After all, Hypothesis 3. is rejected: it can not be stated that there is any statistically 
significant difference in the investment structure (conservativeness) between pension 
funds which belong to a financial conglomerate and pension funds that do not have a 
financial conglomerate background. The results of the analysis are more general than 
the hypothesis: they not only suggest that the investment practice of funds belonging 
to financial conglomerates is not more conservative than that of other funds, but they 
also show that the investment practice can not be treated as less conservative. The 
essence of the results is, that the investment practice of the two types of pension fund 




HYPOTHESIS 4.:  
IN THE COST STRUCTURE OF PENSION FUNDS,  THAT PARTICIPATE IN FINANCIAL 
CONGLOMERATES ADMININSTRATIVE COSTS PLAY A MORE CONSIDERABLE ROLE.  
 
Among the cost items, administrative costs are in the analysis of special interest, 
because these may be related to the participation in a financial conglomerate. For the 
testing of the hypothesis I constructed a variable that measures the proportion of 
administrative cost in the operation costs.  
                                                           
10 Had the analysis showed that there is a difference between funds which belong to financial 
conglomerates and other funds that do not belong to financial conglomerates, it would have made sense 
to examine further which would have been the direction of the difference (which type of pension funds 
would have been more operation cost efficient).  
9 
 
In the discriminant analysis this variable shows – beside the variables that represent 
„market power” – the highest correlation with the discriminant function (the 
correlation is 0.26, it is however relatively low). The one-way ANOVA analysis 
shows following results: 
 
 
  sum of squares df  F  sig.  
Between groups  12.14 1  13.75  0,00 
Within groups  76.85 87     
 
 
The results mean, that the examined variable takes significantly different values in the 
two groups (participating and non-participating funds), but since the distribution of 
the variable cannot be considered as normal and the F-value is not extremely high, the 
results have to be interpreted cautiously. The group means in the two groups are 
however relatively different (0.93 at the funds with a financial conglomerate 
background and –0.14 at the other funds). The ANOVA analysis shows, that the two 
types of pension funds can not be treated as identical and the values of the group 
means show, that pension funds which belong to a financial conglomerate are 
generally above the average (0.93 > 0), while other funds are generally below the 
average (–0.14 < 0). 
 
Based on these results, Hypothesis 4. can be accepted: that means, that it can be 
treated as a significant result, that in pension funds which participate in a financial 






HYPOTHESIS 5.:  
IN THE COST STRUCTURE OF PENSION FUNDS,  THAT PARTICIPATE IN FINANCIAL 
CONGLOMERATES MEMBERSHIP RECRUITMENT COSTS PLAY A MORE CONSIDERABLE 
ROLE.  
 
In the literature one of the most interesting questions is, whether financial 
conglomerates can attain efficiency by using among others their brand name and 
existing infrastucture (for example branch network) of one entity at another entity of 
the conglomeration. Membership recruitment costs represent cost items, that are 
related to this phenomenon, it is very interesting, whether there exist differences in 
this field between the participating and non-participating funds. 
 
Among the 17 selected variables there is a variable that measures the proportion of the 
membership recruitment cost in the operation costs. In the one-way ANOVA analysis 
the results show F=6.34 that implies sig.=0.01, that means – considering that the 
distribution of the examined variable cannot be treated as normal – no significant 
                                                           
11 These results show unambigously that the examined cost items (administration costs) play a 
relatively more considerable role, since the group means in funds with a financial conglomerate 
background are above the average.   
10 
difference between the two groups, which means that the group means can be treated 
as identical in the statistical sence (neither of them can be seen as bigger or smaller 
than the other). 
 
After all, Hypothesis 5. is rejected: that means, that according to the data and 
regarding the membership recruitment costs among the operation cost items, there is 
no significant difference between the funds that participate in financial conglomerates 
and other funds that do not belong to financial conglomerates. This hypothesis posed 
the question, whether membership recruitment costs play a more considerable role in 
the cost structure of pension funds that belong to financial conglomerates; the analysis 
showed that there is statistically no difference between the two types of funds (which 





After analysing the structure of the Hungarian voluntary pension fund market two 
different groups seem to be separated: the one contains pension funds with average 
characteristics and low market power constructing a relatively homogeneous group 
while the other heterogeneous group containing the other funds. The members of the 
heterogeneous group are mostly participants in financial conglomerates. The 
differences of the funds belonging to financial conglomerates appear only in few 
characteristics: these funds represent significantly greater market power but regarding 
other characteristics (for example efficiency) the analysis showed no persuasive 




                                                           
12 These results also mean, that the reverse hypothesis could also have been rejected: according to the 
data not only can not be stated that membership recruitment costs play a more considerable role in the 
cost structure of pension funds that belong to financial conglomerates, but it can also not be declared 
that membership recruitment costs play a less considerable role in the cost structure of pension funds 
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